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Dated: October 26, 2009

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In re) Chapter 11
JAKE'S GRANITE SUPPLIES, L.L.C.,) CASE NO. 2:05-bk-10601-RJH
Debtor.)))
JAKE'S GRANITE SUPPLIES, L.L.C., Plaintiff,))) ADVERSARY NO. 2:07-ap-00145-RJH
v.	
JOHN BEAVER, et al.,) MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendants.)

This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by the parties, SNS Civil Design Group and Kimball Siegfried (collectively "SNS") and Jake's Granite Supplies ("Jake's"), on March 23, 2009 on the breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel claims alleged in Jake's first amended complaint dated October 24, 2008. At the status hearing held September 21, 2009, the Court took the respective motions for summary judgment under advisement. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes no genuine issues of material fact remain, and SNS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all three claims.

Background

Jake's, the former owner of a sand and gravel operation near Buckeye, Arizona, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 13, 2005. On February 23, 2006, John and Vicki Beaver (the "Beavers") filed a claim in the bankruptcy case alleging they have title through adverse possession to fourteen acres of real property previously owned by Jake's. Under their claim, the Beavers contend they are allowed to recover \$700,000 from the proceeds of Jake's sale of the property to Cemex Construction Materials L. P. ("Cemex") that closed on November 27, 2005.

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In September and October 2003, Jake's entered into purchase agreements for three parcels referred to as the Quackenbush, Stone, and Dycus parcels. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company ("Fidelity") served as the escrow agent for the purchases and issued ALTA Extended Owner's Title Insurance Policies ("ALTA extended owner's policies") to Jake's for the parcels.² According to Jake's closing instructions, Fidelity was to close escrow only upon its unconditional agreement to issue an ALTA extended owner's policy with a survey endorsement for each of the parcels.³ In order to obtain the ALTA extended owner's policies, Jake's was required to provide Fidelity a survey⁴ of the property that complied with ALTA/ACSM standards.⁵

Clay Sourant ("Sourant"), Jake's principal, asked General Engineering ("General") to provide an ALTA survey. General contacted SNS and provided SNS and Siegfried with a "Commitment for Title Insurance" (the "title commitments") prepared by Fidelity for each of the properties.⁶ Siegfried, a surveyor employed by SNS, prepared and signed a survey entitled

¹ Pursuant to this Court's order confirming Jake's Chapter 11 plan, Jake's reserved \$700,000 of the proceeds from the Cemex transaction on account of the Beavers' claim.

² "ALTA" is an acronym for the American Land Title Association. An ALTA extended owner's policy insures the purchaser against unrecorded liens, encumbrances, and other unrecorded matters that might affect title ownership to the property. An ALTA standard owner's policy only insures against recorded encumbrances.

³ A survey endorsement is a commitment by a title insurer that it will insure against loss or damage the insured may sustain if the condition of the property is not the same as delineated on a survey of the property. Obtaining extended owner's policies with survey endorsements for each parcel was a condition Jake's lender required in order to fund the loans.

⁴ Although Fidelity noted in the escrow file, "3.19 sv waived per Shannon," which apparently meant that Jake's real estate agent, Shannon Everett, had waived the survey requirement in the purchase agreements, the sole consequence of this waiver was that Jake's could not could not cancel the purchase contracts and seek a refund of its earnest money if Jake's later performed a survey that revealed something objectionable about the property.

⁵ Paragraph 5f of the ALTA/ACSM standards provides: "The character of any and all evidence of possession shall be stated and the location of such evidence carefully given in relation to both the measured boundary lines and those established by the record. An absence of notation on the survey shall be presumptive of no observable evidence of possession."

⁶ The title commitments provided a legal description of each of the parcels, identified Jake's as the purchaser of the parcels, and indicated that Jake's had ordered ALTA extended owner's policies and required an ALTA/ACSM survey. Although the title commitment for the Quackenbush parcel was for standard insurance, this appears to have been an error. The parties do not dispute that Jake's ordered extended policies for all three parcels, and the policies ultimately issued were for extended coverage.

"ALTA/ACSM Land Title Survey" in July 2004. The survey identifies the parcels purchased by Jake's and references the title commitments' order numbers and certain of the Schedule B title exceptions listed in the title commitments. The survey certification provides: "This is to certify that this map or plat and the survey on which it is based were made (I) in accordance with 'Minimum Standard Detail Requirements for ALTA/ACSM Land Title Surveys'" and "The premises surveyed have no known discrepancies, boundary line conflicts, encroachments, overlapping of improvements, easements or right-of-ways except as shown, and has access to or from a dedicated roadway."

The survey did not reveal the encroachments and visible appropriations that form the basis of the Beavers' adverse possession claim. Siegfried testified during deposition that he did not disagree with the conclusion of Jake's expert that the survey failed to comply with ALTA/ACSM standards and that the survey certification was inaccurate. He also agreed that it would be reasonable for someone looking at the survey to conclude that it was an ALTA survey.⁸

Before issuing the title policies, Fidelity conducted its own inspection of the properties. The inspectors noted locked gates and questioned whether they had access to the parcels, but Fidelity apparently did not conduct a follow-up investigation. Following its inspection, Fidelity issued ALTA extended owner's policies⁹ and closed escrow on the transactions in October 2004.

Analysis

Summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material

⁷ The record does not reflect how the survey was transmitted to Fidelity and Jake's, but the parties do not dispute that both Fidelity and Jake's received it prior to the close of escrow. The record is also unclear as to how SNS was paid for the work, but it appears that Jake's paid General, and General paid SNS.

⁸ Siegfried, however, inserted a paragraph on the survey separate from the certification section that read: "The purpose of this survey is to retrace the boundaries of the subject properties and to indicate the location of easements of record in accordance with ALTA/ACSM standards." Siegfried testified that someone at Fidelity instructed him not to perform an ALTA survey to cut costs, although he does not remember with whom he spoke. Barbara Teel, the Fidelity escrow officer, and Jane Magruder, the Fidelity title officer, testified that they never spoke with Siegfried or anyone else at SNS.

The title policies contain the following survey endorsements: "The Company assures the Insured that said land is the same as that delineated on the plat of survey made by SNS Civil Design Group on July 23, 2004, designated Job No. 040413. The Company hereby insures said Assured against loss which said Assured shall sustain in the event that the assurance herein shall prove to be incorrect."

fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

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Breach of Contract

Jake's asserts that it was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between General and SNS to provide an ALTA/ACSM survey for Jake's purchase of the properties. To prevail on a breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary in Arizona, "an intention to benefit that person must be indicated in the contract itself." Norton v. First Federal Savings, 128 Ariz. 176, 178, 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981) (citing *Irwin v. Murphey*, 81 Ariz. 148, 302 P.2d 534 (1956)). "[T]he benefit contemplated must be intentional and direct," Irwin, 81 Ariz. at 153, 302 P.2d at 537 (citing Treadway v. Western Cotton Oil & Ginning Co., 40 Ariz. 125, 139, 10 P.2d 371, 376 (1932)), and "it definitely must appear that the parties intend to recognize the third party as the primary party in interest," Norton, 128 Ariz. at 178, 624 P.2d at 856 (quoting Irwin, 81 Ariz. at 154, 302 P.2d at 538). Here, there is no single, written contract; instead the contract must be pieced together from the telephone and fax communications between General and SNS and the survey prepared by SNS. Despite SNS's argument that there is no contract, the record reflects that General's telephone call to Siegfried and the faxes General sent SNS containing the title commitments prepared by Fidelity formed General's offer, and the survey formed SNS' acceptance. The record suggests Jake's paid General for the survey, and General paid SNS.

SNS received the title commitments prior to surveying the parcels, which named Jake's as the purchaser and indicated that Jake's required an ALTA survey to obtain ALTA extended owner's policies from Fidelity. The survey prepared by SNS references the legal description provided by Fidelity, the Fidelity title commitment report numbers, and certain of the title exceptions contained in the title commitments, but does not reference Jake's.

Mere knowledge that Jake's was the purchaser and required an ALTA survey to obtain ALTA extended owner's policies for the property is not sufficient to establish Jake's as the intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between SNS and General under Arizona law. While Jake's may have been an incidental beneficiary of the contract, the record does not support a conclusion that SNS provided the survey with the expressed intent to directly benefit Jake's as the primary party in interest of the contract when the survey references only Fidelity and not Jake's. Because

claim.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Jake's cannot establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between General and

SNS under Arizona law, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of SNS on the breach of contract

Jake's negligent misrepresentation claim alleges Siegfried failed to note the visible appropriations that form the basis of the Beavers' adverse possession claim on a survey he certified was in compliance with ALTA/ACSM standards. Arizona recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (1977):

One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.

Haisch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 197 Ariz. 606, 610, 5 P.3d 940, 944 (Ct. App. 2000). Restatement § 552(2)(a) further provides that liability for loss due to negligent misrepresentation is limited to "the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the professional] intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it." See Sage v. Blagg Appraisal Co., 221 Ariz. 33, 209 P.3d 169 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an appraiser retained by a lender to appraise a home in connection with a mortgage transaction may be liable to the prospective buyer for failure to exercise reasonable care in performing the appraisal if the appraiser knew the recipient intended to provide the appraisal to the homebuyer).

The parties do not dispute that Siegfried and SNS in the course of their business supplied false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions. Siegfried conceded that the survey he sealed failed to comply with ALTA/ACSM standards and that the survey certification was inaccurate. Siegfried also admitted it would be reasonable for a person looking at the survey to conclude that it was an ALTA survey.

Sourant testified, however, that Jake's relied on the survey certification only to the extent that an ALTA survey was a necessary condition to obtain the ALTA extended owner's policies its bank required to fund the loans and close escrow on the properties. Sourant also

testified that he did not know the difference between an ALTA survey and a boundary-line depiction. Since Jake's obtained the extended policies with survey endorsements it sought, it cannot show that it relied to its detriment on the survey certification. Jake's got everything it contracted for and needed – a survey sufficient for the bank to fund and to close escrow. Beyond that, there is no evidene Jake's actually relied upon the surveyor's false certification or even knew what it meant.

Since Jake's did not rely to its detriment on the survey certification, it is not necessary to reach the question as to whether SNS knew that Fidelity intended to supply the survey to Jake's and therefore owed a duty of care to Jake's. *See Kuehn v. Stanley*, 208 Ariz. 124, 128, 91 P.3d 346, 350 (Ct. App. 2004) (affirming summary judgment in favor of appraiser after concluding homebuyers could not establish they relied on an appraisal in purchasing property).

Because Jake's has not shown detrimental reliance on the survey certification and has not incurred damages from such reliance, summary judgement on Jake's negligent misrepresentation claim is appropriate in favor of SNS.

Promissory Estoppel

Jake's argues SNS's certification that the survey met ALTA standards constituted a promise to Jake's and that Jake's relied on that promise to its detriment in deciding to close escrow on the purchases. Arizona follows the definition of promissory estoppel as it appears in the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 90 (1981):

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for the breach may be limited as justice requires.

Chewning v. Palmer, 133 Ariz. 136, 138, 650 P.2d 438, 440 (1982).

For Jake's to prevail on its promissory estoppel claim, it must prove that SNS made a promise to Jake's, on which SNS should reasonably have expected Jake's to rely, and that Jake's actually relied on the promise. However, the record suggests that the contract between SNS and General was a unilateral one: General requested and promised to pay for a survey of the property, and SNS performed a survey. SNS did not make a promise, either to General or to Jake's; its

acceptance was through performance. Even if the record suggested that the contract was bilateral, and the survey certification constituted a promise, that promise could only be directed to Fidelity, not to Jake's, because the survey references only Fidelity.

Even if the survey certification constituted a promise to Jake's, it could not prove that it relied on the promise to its detriment. To the extent that Jake's relied on the survey's certification that it complied with ALTA/ACSM standards, Sourant testified it was merely as a condition to obtain the ALTA extended owner's policies that Jake's needed to close escrow. Jake's obtained the extended policies and closed escrow on the properties. Jake's reliance on the survey did not cause its damages; it received extended coverage against claims such as the Beavers' and suffered no harm.

Jake's further argues that Fidelity's reliance, as an agent of Jake's, should be imputed to Jake's, as the principal. An agent's knowledge can be imputed to the principal, and Jake's argues that the *Chicago Title & Trust* case extends this imputation to the agent's reliance. It does not, however, extend imputation to the agent's *detrimental* reliance. This Court is aware of no authority, and none has been cited, extending an agent's detrimental reliance to the principal, where the detriment was only to the agent and not to the principal. In short, where only the agent detrimentally relied, the cause of action belongs to the agent, not to the principal.

Finally, from the record it is clear that Fidelity acted as Jake's agent only with respect to the escrow transaction, not with respect to the issuance of the ALTA title insurance policy. While Fidelity acted as Jake's agent in the escrow transaction, Fidelity was not subject to Jake's control in its issuance of the title policies. *Urias v. PCS Health Systems, Inc.*, 211 Ariz. 81, 88, 118 P.3d 29, 36 (Ct. App. 2005) ("In determining whether an agency relationship existed between two parties, a court must find that the principal had the right to control the purported agent's conduct for the transaction at issue."). Therefore, Fidelity's reliance in issuing the ALTA title policy, if any, cannot be imputed to Jake's. Fidelity was harmed by reliance on the surveyor's false certification only by its issuance of the title policy, not by its closing of escrow. But the title-issuer's reliance is not imputed to Jake's.

Because SNS did not make a promise to Jake's, and Fidelity's reliance, if any, cannot

1	be imputed to Jake's, summary judgement on Jake's promissory estoppel claim is granted in favor
2	of SNS.
3	Conclusion
4	For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate in
5	favor of SNS on all three of Jake's claims.
6	DATED AND SIGNED ABOVE
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8 9 10 11	Copy of the foregoing e-mailed/mailed this 27th day of October, 2009, to: Robert Caley Brown, Esq. Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander robert.brown@mwmf.com Attorneys for Jake's Granite Supplies, L.L.C.
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